Public Opinion Analysis of the Jiangyin Chemical Plant Explosion: How to View the Serious Explosion at the Chemical Plant in Xiangshui, Yancheng

At around 14:48 on March 16 this year, a major explosion occurred at Jiangsu Tianjiayi Chemical Co., Ltd., located in the Chenjiagang Chemical Industrial Park, Taizhou City, Jiangsu Province. Several residential communities and schools are situated near the blast zone, with one kindergarten only 1.1 kilometers away from the accident site in a straight line. The explosion has already injured a number of children, and local medical institutions are racing against time to treat the wounded. A task force from the Ministry of Emergency Management arrived in Yancheng, Jiangsu, and immediately inspected the explosion site, heading to the on-site command center to guide the rescue and response operations.

Relevant officials from the Ministry of Emergency Management stressed that every possible effort must be made to conduct rescue operations, verify the number of people on site and the condition of facilities, and minimize casualties. All rescue teams must take proper safety protection measures; each rescue site should be led by cadres and staffed with professional technicians to ensure the safety of rescuers. Potential hazards should be fully inspected and controlled, and monitoring and early warning strengthened. A meteorological team shall be established on site to closely monitor wind direction and dynamically adjust rescue arrangements, while taking precautions to prevent environmental pollution incidents.

The Red Cross Society of China urgently allocated supplies to support the relief efforts and organized volunteers to assist on site. Residents flocked to donate blood; blood donation buses on Binjiang Road were crowded with local citizens who came forward voluntarily upon hearing the news. Later, large numbers of local and out-of-town people gathered near the Xiangshui County Government to donate blood voluntarily.

Medical experts were also dispatched for reinforcement. The first batch of expert teams sent by the National Health Commission arrived at the site, consisting of 11 medical professionals from national health emergency teams, including experts in critical care medicine, burns, and neurosurgery from Ruijin Hospital Affiliated to Shanghai Jiao Tong University School of Medicine, as well as psychological counseling experts from Beijing Anding Hospital Affiliated to Capital Medical University. This disaster reflects the great love and mutual assistance among people. Natural and industrial disasters are unpredictable, yet what we can do is strive to save the lives of the victims.

Public Opinion Analysis of the Jiangyin Chemical Plant Explosion: What Happened in the Yancheng Chemical Blast and How Can Such Accidents Be Prevented?

The cause of the accident is still under investigation. The state has set up an inspection team for the “March 21” exceptionally serious explosion accident at Tianjiayi Company in Xiangshui, Jiangsu, which has launched an in-depth probe.

Preventive Measures:

1. Improve and refine safety supervision and inspection systems.

2. Strengthen the management of production equipment.

3. Upgrade production technology and capabilities.

4. Enhance professional training for staff members.

5. Regulate mechanical and electrical equipment…

Other comment: There are about 2,000 hazardous chemical manufacturers, and more than 200 renewed their licenses this year.

Other comment: The chemical plant explosion has caused multiple deaths and many injuries. The accident is under investigation. Sources suggest it was caused by improper operation that ignited a production unit, and the fire was not effectively contained at an early stage, leading to an explosion involving benzene. Most accidents result from negligence and a lack of safety awareness among personnel, who ignore potential hazards.

In fact, most accidents could be avoided if all safety regulations were strictly enforced, including three-level safety training before employment, safety reminders before starting work, and pre-shift meetings every morning. However, many safety training programs are merely formalities, and pre-shift meetings are perfunctory, lacking effective supervision and real effects.

There are many domestic companies engaged in related research, such as Long’an Safety Technology, which provides an automated training system allowing employees to study via mobile phones without organizing in-person classes or hiring teachers; automatic assessments are conducted once study hours are completed. Safety quizzes are integrated with fingerprint attendance checks to instill safety awareness. Pre-shift meetings can be recorded by mobile phones, with automatic reports generated including staff lists and meeting content, facilitating supervision and statistics. With joint efforts, China’s safety situation will surely improve.

Public Opinion Analysis of the Jiangyin Chemical Plant Explosion: Potential Work Safety Hazards in the March 21 Xiangshui Chemical Plant Explosion

Potential work safety hazards identified in the Xiangshui chemical plant explosion are as follows:

1. Responsible persons failed to pass the assessment of safety knowledge and management competence.

2. Only one certified worker for instrumentation and special operations, insufficient to meet actual production safety needs.

3. Incomplete operating procedures for production equipment, lacking rules and process indicators for the benzene tank area; no patrol inspection system or clear requirements for safety inspections.

4. Operating procedures were not revised or updated in a timely manner after interlocks were installed on nitration equipment.

5. DCS and SIS temperature transmitters for some secondary nitration reactors shared the same pressure tap.

6. No emergency cut-off valves installed at the tank roots of the benzene and alcohol storage zones, which constituted Class II potential accidents.

7. Emergency cut-off valves on hydrogen supply lines for some secondary nitration reactors were bypassed, and interlock systems were not activated.

8. The equipment cabinet room and monitoring center were improperly located inside the nitration workshop.

9. Work safety responsibility systems for some posts were inconsistent with actual production, e.g., the procurement department had no requirements for the quality of safety-supplied products.

10. Poor on-site management with frequent spillage; insufficient safety warning signs, some of which were blurred, and no on-site direction signs.

11. Non-standard hot work management, e.g., some safety measures lacked confirmers, and flammable gas analysis results were falsely recorded as “non-existent”.

12. No emergency spill response measures at benzene and alcohol loading/unloading areas; filling points too close to pump zones, with damaged and waterless emergency eyewash stations on site.

13. On-site operators were unaware of the flammable gas alarm settings and emergency response procedures; flammable gas detectors in the nitration workshop had no on-site visual alarm function.

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